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ABSTRACT 
The project to develop the Colorado Benefits Management System (CBMS) was begun with high 
hopes and the best of intentions.  Its vision was to replace six aging legacy systems supporting 
various State administered welfare programs with a single system using current technologies.  
The expected benefits from CBMS were better service to clients and assurance that the State’s 
welfare programs were being administered properly.  The bulk of the development effort was 
outsourced to a large systems integration firm, and a comprehensive project oversight structure 
was put in place.  Despite these actions, the project was troubled from the start.  Nearing one 
more projected conversion date, the two executive sponsors of the project were faced with a 
decision of whether or not to implement the system despite protests from the user community that 
CBMS was not ready to be put into operation.     
Keywords:   acquisition, consultants, conversion, implementation, IV&V, legacy systems, IT 
project management, pilots, runaway projects, user acceptance testing 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Marva Livingston-Hammons and Karen Reinertson, Executive Directors, respectively, of the 
Colorado Department of Human Services and the Colorado Department of Health Care Policy 
and Financing, sat across from each other at the small conference table in Marva’s office.  It was 
August 15, 2004, and they were discussing the letter dated August 13 from the directors of 
human services in four Colorado Counties (reproduced as Appendix 1).  Marva and Karen were 
the two senior State officials charged with oversight of the Colorado Benefits Management 
System (CBMS), which was scheduled to be converted on September 1, 2004 after being 
postponed several times.   
CBMS was undertaken with much optimism and promise.  The project was going to change the 
way Colorado managed its welfare programs. It would replace six existing legacy computer 
systems with one unified system for collecting data, establishing eligibility, and processing 
payments in the following welfare programs:   
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• Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families 
• Adult Protective Services • Aid to the Needy Disabled 
• Food Stamps • Old Age Pension • Children’s Health Plan 
Plus 
• Medicaid • Aid to the Blind  
 
These programs were directed at the State level and administered by the Counties.  When CBMS 
was up and operating, all of Colorado’s welfare programs would use a single up-to-date computer 
system.  With CBMS, clients eligible to receive benefits from more than one program would no 
longer need to find their way to several different offices and file multiple applications.  The sick, 
the hungry, elderly, and children would receive immediate help while the State and the Counties 
would save money. 
In their letter, the county representatives listed several problems and concerns they had with the 
status of CBMS.  They were concerned with: 
• the error rate in the user acceptance test 
(UAT) 
• inadequate testing of interfaces to other 
service programs 
• the security of the system • customer service/staff workload issues 
• numerous conversion issues • unresolved system defects 
• compliance with Federal law  
 
The letter concluded by stating: 
As a result of the above issues, the four pilot Counties adamantly believe that the 
implementation of CBMS on September 1, 2004, is unacceptable.  A premature 
implementation will result in serious impacts to clients and County Departments 
of Human Services.  We feel the system must first be adequately tested and the 
pilots successful before moving forward on this major computer conversion. 
Marva and Karen looked at each other with concern in their eyes.  When they agreed to be co-
chairs of the CBMS project’s Executive Oversight Committee (EOC), they had no idea the project 
was going to be such a frustrating and aggravating experience.  After all, they were senior 
managers in State Government, not IT professionals.  CBMS took up too much of their time 
already and they wanted to get it behind them.    
Still, they knew they needed to respond to the Counties’ letter and were worried about the issues 
it documented.  On the other hand, the project repeatedly requested funds in excess of the 
original appropriation over the last four years from the Joint Budget Committee (JBC) of the 
Colorado Legislature. Marva and Karen were reluctant to ask for more.  Further, a number of 
stakeholders needed to be considered:   
• The internal and external IT professionals 
involved in CBMS 
• The Colorado State Departments 
• The end users in the Counties • The Federal Government 




The Colorado economy was declining after a decade of prosperity, and the State was facing 
deficits.  Some of the CBMS stakeholders were raising red flags, while others gave no indication 
there was any reason not to proceed with the September 1 conversion as planned.  The 
November 2004 elections were looming. 
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Marva and Karen discussed their options, and identified three possible avenues:   
1. They could postpone the conversion until all the stakeholders were satisfied.   
2. They could abort the project.  
3. They could convert on September 1 as scheduled, in spite of the red flags. 
 II.  BACKGROUND 
In 1989, it became apparent that the six legacy systems supporting the welfare systems in 
Colorado were reaching the stage where they needed to be replaced.  They were using obsolete 
technology and were becoming increasingly difficult to maintain.  The late eighties and early 
nineties was the time when many mainframe-based legacy systems were being replaced by 
client-server architectures, taking advantage of the graphical user interfaces available on 
personal computers on the desks of knowledge workers in large organizations, and the advances 
in networking technologies. 
Like many legacy systems of the time, the six Colorado systems were developed at different 
points in time, and typically supported a single program, e.g. Food Stamps.  The vision of CBMS 
was to combine the databases required for the six systems into a single database which 
combined all information concerning a welfare client, and to incorporate the rules for managing 
each program into computer code.  Thus, clients would be better served because a single 
knowledge worker could handle the processing of benefits for multiple programs, clients would 
not need to supply the same information to several knowledge workers at different locations, the 
client information used for all programs would be consistent, and rules for qualification and receipt 
of benefits would be applied correctly.  Since many of the welfare programs were at least partially 
funded by the US Federal Government, the latter point was important for Colorado State 
Departments’ compliance reporting to Federal Agencies.   As an added benefit to clients, 
knowledge workers would be able to receive assurance from CBMS that clients were receiving all 
of the benefits they were entitled to receive.  As an added incentive to the State and Counties, 
once the system was installed, it would result in a reduction in headcount.  A summary of the 
scope and anticipated benefits of the project are shown in Appendix II. 
Despite the benefits envisioned for CBMS, it took nine years to obtain funding for the design, 
construction, and installation of the new system from the Colorado Legislature.  Like any new 
project (in either the public or the private sector), CBMS was required to compete with other 
projects that required incremental funding. CBMS never seemed to rise to the top of the 
Legislature’s priority list.  Finally, in 1999, funds were allocated to begin some initial work.  
Dynamics Research Corporation (DRC) (www.drc.com) was hired to develop a set of 
requirements for CBMS in sufficient detail to include in a Request for Proposal (RFP).  Since IT at 
that time was thriving as a result of the need to solve the Y2K problem1 and the Internet boom, 
skilled IT professionals were in short supply.  As a result, state governments found it difficult to 
compete with the private sector in hiring IT professionals, particularly in those sectors where 
knowledge of state-of-the-art technologies was required.  For this reason, the decision was made 
to engage a professional services firm to handle the development and operation of CBMS. 
The State received two responses to its RFP, one from EDS and the other from IBM.  Both were 
more than $100 million higher than the $220 million the JBC had authorized for the development 
and operation of CBMS over a ten year period.  Accordingly, the State employees responsible for 
acquisition went back to the vendors and asked them to “clarify” their bids, i.e. to find a way to 
                                                     
1 The Y2K problem resulted from the use of 2 digits in referring to years (e.g., 98 rather than 1998) in 
corporate records. It was recognized that computation difficulties would ensue unless the year fields in 
databases were increased to four digits and the computer programs revised accordingly [Wikipedia, 2005]. 
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lower them to not exceed the amount authorized by the legislature’s Joint Budget Committee 
(JBC). 
In the end, EDS (www.eds.com) was awarded the contract.  The three factors that led to its 
selection included the proposal to adopt a “time of touch conversion” (as explained below), a 
phased rollout, and its experience on similar systems in the States of Florida and Arkansas. 
• One key step in a traditional conversion from an old to a new system involves 
converting system data from the old system(s) to the format needed by the new system.  
Usually this conversion is done all at once, at the time of conversion.  EDS concluded 
that a “time of touch” conversion, in which data are converted the first time it was 
accessed by a knowledge worker under the new system, would save both time and 
money. 
• A phased roll-out would make the CBMS available to Counties in phases, rather than all 
at once.  For example, one welfare program might be converted in one County, and 
then made available to other Counties on a phased basis once the bugs were worked 
out in the initial County. 
• EDS had a troubled conversion in Florida in the early nineties [Glass 1998] and pointed 
out that they had learned from the mistakes they made there.  They also had a similar 
project underway in Arkansas and proposed to save time by modifying programs from 
Arkansas to meet Colorado’s requirements.     
 
Even though Federal funds would be used to fund more than half the cost of CBMS, the Federal 
Government did not have a say in the selection of the outside contractor.  On the other hand, they 
could and did specify that an independent verification and validation (IV&V) firm be hired to 
provide independent oversight and reporting on the project’s progress.  Maximus 
(www.maximus.com) was retained as the IV&V firm. 
III. PROJECT ORGANIZATION AND OVERSIGHT 
Experienced IT professionals know that large systems development projects like CBMS are 
among the most complex and challenging tasks that human beings undertake. Project complexity 
tends to increase as the project size increases.  In 1999, an income tax system under 
development for the Colorado Department of Revenue was abandoned after an expenditure of 
some $15 million.  This action caused a flurry of negative publicity. It resulted in establishing the 
Governor’s Office of Innovation and Technology (OIT) by the State Legislature and signed into 
law by Governor Bill Owens.  Among other things, OIT was established to “Transform state 
government, a key element of the technology infrastructure, through the effective, efficient and 
innovative use of technology.” [Bhattacherjee 2000].   
Aborting CBMS after the expenditure of more than $90 million would make taxpayers wonder 
whether the State really knew how to use technology efficiently and effectively.  Recent negative 
publicity also arose from the troubled IT projects in the US Federal Government.  For example, in 
December 2003, an $8 billion Internal Revenue Service project was 40% over budget after 
spending $1 billion [Johnston 2003], and the FBI’s Virtual Case File system designed to help 
track terrorists was rumored to be ready for the scrap heap after well over $100 million had been 
spent [Verton 2004].   
IT professionals are also aware of studies like the Chaos Reports published by the Standish 
Group [2003] on IT project successes and failures.  For example, the latest publicly available 
report at that time, based on a 2003 survey of 13,522 U.S. IT projects completed in 2002, showed 
that just 34% of all IT projects were considered successful, 51% were challenged and 15% were 
dubbed as outright failures.   The report also calculated that “The lost dollar value for U.S. 
projects in 2002 was estimated at $38 billion with another $17 billion in cost overruns for a total 
project waste of $55 billion against $255 billion in project spending.” [Standish 2003].     
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Most seasoned IT professionals learn that one of the principal reasons for failed or less than 
successful projects is a failure to get the business requirements of a new system right.  And, in 
turn, the failure to get the requirements right is most often due to poor communication and 
insufficient involvement and commitment from the users for whom a new system is being 
designed.  
A typical IT project would be organized along the following lines [Flatten et al 1991]: 
• An Executive Sponsor, or product champion, the senior executive in the organization 
who authorizes and obtains funding for the project; 
• A Project Steering Committee, whose members usually are key user managers and a 
senior IT executive; 
• A Project Manager, the individual responsible for the planning and control of the project; 
and 
• The Project Team, individuals assigned to the project with the necessary skills required 
to execute the project plan. 
 
The CBMS project organization was a bit more complicated than most (Figure 1). It consisted of 
the following: 
• Executive Oversight Committee (EOC).  The Executive Oversight Committee was 
chaired by Karen and Marva and included the State Chief Information Officer (CIO) from 
OIT, the CIO from the Department of Human Services, the CIO from the Department of 
Health Care Policy & Financing, and representatives from the following: Counties, Office 
of State Planning and Budgeting (OSPB), Joint Budget Committee (JBC), and non-
county Medical Application providers.  The EOC met bi-monthly (or more often if 
necessary), and was responsible for guiding the project and making appropriate 
executive decisions regarding the project.  
• Colorado Commission on Information Management (IMC).  IMC is a unit of OIT, chaired 
by the State Chief Information Officer. It consists of representatives from the public and 
private sectors.  It oversees IT strategic planning and sets policies for the State of 
Colorado's Information Systems.  The IMC created a CBMS IMC subcommittee which 
met bi-monthly and provided feedback to the Commission on the progress of CBMS. 
• Independent Verification and Validation Contractor (Maximus).  The IV&V contractor 
reported to the OIT.  Maximus provided independent analysis and identification of 
project development risks. It was not part of the development contract, being funded 
separately.  Maximus reviewed all requirements for compliance prior to progressing to 
the next phase of the project (verification), and reviewed all products to assure they 
were in accordance with approved requirements (validation). 
• CBMS Project Quality Assurance Vendor (QA).  An independent QA vendor joined the 
project on July 31, 2001.  Reporting to the EOC, the vendor was responsible for 
implementing project quality assurance processes, monitoring project activities and 
work in progress, reviewing and assessing project deliverables, and reporting status 
findings and    recommendations. 
• Project Manager.  Since a State employee with the requisite skills to serve as project 
manager for CBMS was not available, the State contracted with AMS (www.ams.com), 
a systems integration firm, to furnish a full-time project manager. 
• Project Team.  The project team was a mix of EDS and State employees.  Some of the 
EDS personnel were collocated with the team in Colorado while others worked in 
remote locations. 
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Figure 1. Organization Chart 
 
   
The EOC believed all stakeholders were adequately represented.  However, successful execution 
required that accountability be clear, that responsibility be focused, that the CBMS vision be truly 
shared among all stakeholders, and that the efforts of all stakeholders be well coordinated.  
Furthermore, since CBMS hired both IV&V and QA personnel to perform an independent review 
of the project’s progress, it was important that their periodic reports to the OIT and EOC be 
carefully considered. 
IV. PROJECT EXECUTION 
The project was behind schedule virtually from the beginning. The signed contract with EDS was 
reviewed by IV&V and several concerns were identified:  
• No milestones were specified for the project,  
• Responsibility for deliverables was not pinpointed, and  
• No performance criteria were specified.   
 
A report summarizing these concerns was written and given to OIT.  The report went no further, 
since it was submitted after the contract was already approved.  
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One of the biggest problems with the contract was its fixed price basis.  Typically a project of this 
size and scope will involve many add-ons.  In particular, since the CBMS set of requirements 
were quite ambiguous and the system was expected to operate in a dynamic environment, the 
rationale for a fixed price contract was questionable.  For example, Congress passed a national 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in 1996.  This act created major 
requirements for how agencies handled health-related data. Compliance with the act required 
modifications in the design of CBMS.  With a fixed price contract, there is little to no motivation on 
the part of the contractors to complete additional work.  EDS wanted to stick to the original 
requirements and avoid scope creep2.  Any changes required a change order.  Some of the 
managers estimated that it took two to three weeks to obtain a detailed estimate from EDS on the 
cost of a change, and another month to make the change.   
More and more delays occurred putting the project further behind schedule (Table 1).  
Stakeholders were feeling pressured in various ways.  The State employees were concerned 
about reports to the Federal Government to assure the programs were in compliance, while the 
Counties worried about the way CBMS would work in their offices, the looming workload 
associated with training and data conversion, the ease of use of the system and, of course, the 
welfare of their clients.    
Table 1. Project Timeline 
 
Date Event 
July 14, 2000 Initial Contract with EDS Signed  
April 2001 Project is estimated to be behind by three months 
November 2001 EDS concluded that code from Arkansas project 
won’t work for CBMS 
February 2002 Software toolkit changed to CalWIN 
March 2002 Functionality “trade-off” occurs.  $16.1 million 
additional funds are provided and contract is 
extended nine months 
April 2002 EDS abandons Time of Touch 
January 2004 Maximus IV&V Contract Expires 
March 2004 Problems with access to state portal and higher than 
anticipated volume of problems with the application 
limit progress on pilot tests 
April 2004 Counties learn they will be responsible for manual 
data entry  
April 2004 JBC indicates no additional funding or release time 
will be given to CBMS 
April 2004 Phased conversion approach is abandoned 
July 26-August 6, 2004 Second Pilot test occurs 
August 13, 2004 CCI sends letter to State requesting CBMS not be 
implemented on September 1, 2004 
 
Structural issues were also encountered.  It was unusual in the Colorado State government for 
the prime contractor (EDS) to report to a project manager who was a competitor’s employee.   
Nevertheless, both firms understood their respective roles and worked to cooperate with one 
another. Even so, within six months the project was three months behind. The original project 
managers from both EDS and AMS were replaced with more experienced project managers. This 
turnover was not the only one during the project.  For example, four different State Chief 
                                                     
2 Scope creep refers to changes in a project’s scope by adding new requirements or new features that 
increase time to completion and cost.  
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Information Officers served between 2001 to 2004.  Overall, CBMS had 32 staff members in key 
project positions turn over during the duration of the project. 
Awareness of the delays was becoming more widespread. Accordingly, the Colorado Social 
Service Directors Association asked to be involved in the project.  Four representatives were 
appointed to an oversight team:  Emmanual Manos from Denver County, Brenda Woolsey from 
Arapahoe County, Richard Cozzette from Fremont County, and Kirby Stone from Broomfield 
County.  To make things worse, EDS stated that project had been underestimated.  Their original 
estimate to complete CBMS was 8,650 hours.  Now they estimated the project would consume 
20,000 hours. 
The State’s Joint Budget Committee began balking at requests to allocate additional funds or 
release time to CBMS. Therefore, some of the desired features of CBMS (such as electronic 
signatures, scanning, and fraud detection) were put on the shelf. In November 2001, EDS 
concluded that the existing code from the State of Arkansas project was not a good fit for 
Colorado and recommended that CBMS use code that EDS developed for the CALWIN project in 
California.  The proposal to use the CALWIN code was accepted by the directors in February 
2002.” 
In February, 2002, the directors changed the basic “tool kit” to CalWIN, code that EDS developed 
for the State of California.  The project was extended nine months, for an additional $16.1 million.  
In April, 2002, the time of touch conversion proposal was officially abandoned. Twenty-one 
months were expended in the effort to use time of touch, the “innovative and proven methodology 
to convert data into CBMS.” The design of the decision tables3 (DTs), used by the Rules Engine 
in the CBMS software to determine benefit eligibility, automatically began to run excessively 
behind schedule.  Little by little the dream project was turning into a nightmare. 
On January 1, 2004, the IV&V firm submitted their final report. [Maximus, 2004].   The Executive 
Summary noted that the detailed reports IV&V prepared weekly “were delivered to OIT for 
disposition, while a summary of each weekly status report was distributed to a number of 
participating State and Federal organizations as determined by OIT.”  The final report’s Executive 
Summary went on to say that  
“Unfortunately, the CBMS environment was not generally conducive to accepting 
or responding to the IV&V findings in a timely manner, resulting in greater impact 
to project progress than should have occurred”.   
The report summarized major flaws in the following areas:   
• The State’s vendor acquisition strategies,  
• establishment of the initial CBMS requirements baseline,  
• technical understanding of the State’s requirements versus the vendor’s proposed 
solution, and  
• establishment of an adequate State organizational structure (processes, procedures, 
resources, organizational structure, interfaces, etc.) to manage the CBMS.   
 
All of these issues had been repeatedly raised at various times in IV&V weekly reports between 
November 2000 and January 2004.   
                                                     
3 Decision tables are a precise yet compact way to model complicated logic. Decision tables, like if-then-else 
and switch-case statements, associate conditions with actions to perform. But, unlike the control structures 
found in traditional programming languages, decision tables can associate many independent conditions 
with several actions in an elegant way [Wikipedia, 2005]. 
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The final report gave the following assessment, in part, of the project status as of January 2004: 
•  Decision Tables, a State responsibility to develop, are difficult for the State to manage 
with any predictability.  
♦ They continue to cause delays in the completion of initial development of the 
complete suite of CBMS DTs.  
♦ A high volume of defects are encountered once the DTs began User 
Acceptance Testing (UAT).  
♦ The DTs cause delays in correcting defects and completing UAT.  
♦ The DTs create significant doubt as to the State’s ability to manage DTs 
during Pilot and production. 
• A number of key tasks were not planned in detail or assessed against other key project 
activities and milestones making it difficult to track, report, or predict project progress 
effectively or accurately. 
• County readiness for Pilot or rollout is not clear.  Although discussions of readiness 
occur between the CBMS Project Management Office and the Counties during 
meetings, structured and systematic progress reporting by the Counties continues to be 
extremely weak. 
•  UAT continues to slip, with increased planning of concurrent events that increases the 
risk of project failure.     
The Maximus contract ended in January 2004, as originally scheduled, even though CBMS was 
still underway.  Neither the EOC nor the OIT was able to come up with funding to extend the 
Maximus contract.   
Significant roadblocks were also present in the pilot testing for CBMS.  The Counties requested a 
three-month pilot, but the project pared it down to six weeks.  The decision tables were still not 
completed even during the pilot.  In March, 2004, the EOC reported that progress was not made 
in the pilot as had been planned due to early issues with access to the State Portal and the higher 
than anticipated volume of problems with the application.   
The last piece of the CBMS’s initial innovative vision was abandoned in April 2004.  EDS 
informed the State that the phased conversion wouldn’t work.  The state of the art described in 
the original EDS proposal was now completely gone from CBMS.  The conversion and rollout 
plans needed to be redone.  In addition, more data needs were identified.  It was estimated that 
only 25-35% of the data could be converted within the new system, and 65-75% of the data 
needed manual entry and cleansing4.  The EOC informed the Counties that the planned 
Centralized Data Entry process to assist Counties with data entry was not feasible.  Instead, 
funds would be allocated to the Counties.  Four months from rollout, the Counties learned the 
manual burden of entering data required by CBMS would be left to them.  The Counties projected 
the time and cost now required for the data entry and EDS claimed the projections were grossly 
in error. The project was extended to September 1, 2004.  JBC called this the “drop dead” date.  
From July 26, 2004 to August 6, 2004, three weeks before the planned September 1 rollout, a 
two-week pilot was held even though some functionalities were not ready for testing. The 
Counties expressed a concern about the pilots but EDS said they were just afraid of change.  
EDS said they saw the same fear from their experience in similar projects they led in Arizona, 
Texas, and Florida.  The pilot testing proceeded.   
Two sets of scenarios were used in the UAT, one developed by the State, and another developed 
by the Counties.  In the August 13, 2004 letter from the Counties, it was stated, “The pilot planned 
scenarios experienced a 63% accuracy rate, and the controlled state scenarios a 94% accuracy 
                                                     
4 Cleansing refers to detecting and removing and/or correcting data that is incorrect, out-of-date, redundant, 
incomplete, or incorrectly formatted [Webopedia, 2005] 
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rate.” Problems in the pilots included incorrect client notices, poor interfaces, long system 
response time, requirements for mass changes, overpayments, improper batch authorization, and 
inaccurate reports.  A fallback plan was developed and tested.  CBMS would be given 60 days to 
work, or the Counties would return to the legacy systems. 
V.  THE DECISION 
Marva and Karen wrote their three options on the white board in Marva’s office:  First, they could 
postpone the conversion until the stakeholders were satisfied.  Second, they could abort the 
project given the politics and funding issues.  Third, they could convert on September 1 as 
scheduled, in spite of the risks.   
Although it was clearly a viable option, they preferred not to postpone the conversion.  
Postponement would mean they would need to go back to the JBC (again) and ask for more 
money.  Of course, postponement could prevent post-conversion operational problems by 
addressing issues before launching CBMS.  Aborting the project was not appealing to them 
either. That would risk even worse negative publicity than was experienced by the State 
Department of Revenue when it abandoned its Income Tax Development System in 1999.  
Overriding the concerns of the users and going ahead with the conversion on September 1 was 
their third option.  After all, they had been assured by most of the CBMS IT professionals that the 
Counties were overreacting, and that all large systems encountered problems after conversion.  
Further, they were told, the project team had sixty days in which they could revert to the old 
legacy systems if CBMS could not be fixed to everyone’s satisfaction.  That seemed to be a pretty 
good safety net in case the doomsayers turned out to be right. On the other hand, the 
stakeholders were concerned about launching on September 1. 
Marva and Karen looked at each other again and wondered, “What should we recommend to 
Governor Owens, and how should we respond to the Counties’ letter?” 
Editor’s notes:  A teaching note for faculty listed in the ISWorld Faculty directory is available from Donald J.  
McCubbrey (dmccubbr@du.edu). This case was received on August 26, 2005 and was published on 
October 26, 2005. 
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APPENDIX I. LETTER FROM DIRECTORS OF HUMAN SERVICES  
 
John W. Hickenlooper 
 Mayor  
   
 
 









Colorado Department of Health Care 
Policy and Financing 
 
Dear Marva and Karen: 
I am writing on behalf of Denver, Broomfield, Arapahoe and Fremont Counties.  As you 
know, the four counties have just completed a two week CBMS pilot.  It is our 
understanding that you will be making the final “Go/No GO” decision by Tuesday, 
August 17, 2004.  We therefore feel it is critical that you receive our input and 
recommendations on this decision prior to that date. 
The counties have spent thousands of hours preparing for CBMS, and will continue to do 
so as we are working towards conversion and implementation.  We are enthusiastic about 
CBMS, its functionalities, and the improved Customer Service it could potentially offer 
our clients.  However, as we stated in the past, we do not want to prematurely convert to 
a system that may provide inaccurate benefits to over 596,000 Colorado clients.  As pilot 
counties, we have serious concerns regarding the readiness of this project, including 
conversion issues, potential lawsuits, the high error rate experienced by the pilot planned 
scenarios, security, procedural papers, Federal sanctions and the number of unresolved 
Severity I and II problems.  Until we feel more comfortable with the maturity of this 
application, we cannot support a “Go” decision on implementation in September, and in 
fact, we strongly oppose the roll out as planned. 
CITY & COUNTY OF DENVER 
 
Department of Human Services 
Accredited by Child Welfare League of America Since 1949 
Roxane White, Manager 
1200 Federal Boulevard 
Denver, Colorado  80204 
Phone: 720-944-1700 
FAX:  720-944-1731 
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An overview of our primary issues regarding the CBMS pilot are as follows: 
• Error rate—The pilot planned scenarios experienced a 63% accuracy rate, and the 
controlled state scenarios a 94% accuracy rate.  The commitment was that CBMS 
would not be implemented until the accuracy rate was 98-99%.  At a 90% 
accuracy over 60,000 clients would be adversely affected.  The current error rate 
of over 30% is not acceptable, and the system cannot be implemented until we 
reach, at a minimum, a 98% rate. 
 
• Security—Security continues to be an issue.  In Fremont County, a user who 
should not have had the access, was able to go in and authorize a payment 
without supervisor intervention.  Additionally, a user was able to go into another 
county and reduce the amount of a claim, while yet another user was able to go 
into another county and delete a miscellaneous payment.  These issues open the 
door for potential employee fraud and create regulatory compliance issues. 
 
• Conversion Issues—Numerous conversion issues have been identified during 
Pilot II, mostly due to incorrect data mapping, i.e., data is converted into wrong 
fields.  For instance, children are being converted as to applying for long term 
care, or adult medical cases are showing that the clients do not meet the level of 
care.  Some persons/cases were not converted. 
 
• Federal law—We remain concerned regarding compliance with the Federal law.  
In particular, the Food Stamp mass change, based on estimation of benefit 
change, will incorrectly update the Food Stamp benefits to tens of thousands of 
clients.  This will not meet the Federal requirement of timely and accurate 
benefits, in addition to the tremendous work load on staff to correct over 80,000 
cases prior to the freeze flag being lifted.  The recovery effort on this alone is 
tremendous.  The same problems will exist as it relates to the COLA for Adult 
Programs on December 31, 2004. 
 
Client noticing has numerous problems, with the most notable being a breach of 
confidentiality by displaying SSN’s, including the Absent Parent’s on the 
Statement of Facts.  Also of concern are the legal issues involved with improper 
noticing, where the incorrect person is cited for the action or the incorrect reason 
to support the action taken is cited.  Other client notice issues include denying 
benefits for a program area, but sending the notice of a new worker for that 
program, or denying benefits but noticing the client that benefits were approved.  
This issue alone may result in an extreme number of appeals and sanctions. 
In addition to these major issues with compliance of the Federal law, we cannot 
exclude the concern that a 30% error rate in benefit determination/grant 
calculation, in conjunction with the benefit freeze flag, will result in clients to be 
paid who should not be paid, or clients to be to be paid incorrectly. 
• Interfaces—To date, only 10% of the interfaces to other service programs have 
been fully tested and found successful.  This is of major concern, as problems 
with CBMS will not only impact client benefits in this system, but could be 
disastrous to programs such as Child Support, Child Care and Child Welfare.  
The interface with Social Security (SDX for SSI cases) during the Pilot II testing 
did not perform as expected for the 1634 cases and can actually duplicate cases. 
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• Customer Service/Staff workload issues—All of the above issues adversely 
impact the workload on staff and the level of customer service that we provide to 
our clients.  In addition to the areas previously noted, we are extremely 
concerned about the large number of procedures that require staff to work around 
the system.  These appear to be volumes, and the training alone to be able to 
perform these procedures is insurmountable.  Additionally, staff are finding the 
time that it takes to complete AI and II is not reasonable, and staff are even 
recommending clients complete a paper application and the information be data 
entered into CBMS, rather than conducting live interviews. 
 
• TPN’s and Defects—To date, over 107 catastrophic and disabling problems are 
still unresolved.  Even if the Project Team were able to fix all the errors by roll 
out, there is no ability for the counties to be able to verify the success of these 
changes.  This translates into our 596,000 plus clients serving as test cases for the 
system. 
 
• Last Legacy Payment Freeze Flag—The Decision Support System, Conversion 
Case Program Flag Report, indicates what cases have been assigned the Freeze 
Flag.  Denver, Arapahoe, and Fremont Counties are researching the report 
because only about one quarter of the County caseload was assigned the Freeze 
Flag.  Consequently, at the time of conversion, 75% of the cases could close. 
 
As a result of the above issues, the four pilot counties adamantly believe that the 
implementation of CBMS on September 1, 2004, is unacceptable.  A premature 
implementation will result in serious impacts to clients and County Departments of 
Human Services.  We feel the system must first be adequately tested and the pilots 
successful before moving forward on this major computer conversion. 





Roxane White, Manager   Brian Field 




Karen Beye     Steven Clifton 
Broomfield Department of Health & Human Fremont Department of Human Services 
Services 
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APPENDIX II. ARCHIVED CBMS PROJECT OVERVIEW 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
CBMS    Colorado Benefits Management System 
CIO        Chief Information Officer  
DT          Decision Table 
EOC       Executive Oversight Committee 
HIPAA    Health Insurance Portablity and Accountability Act  
IMC        Information Management Commission 
IV&V       Independent verification and validiation 
JBC        Joint Budget Committee 
OIT         Office of Innovation and Technology 
OSPB     Office of State Planning and Budgeting 
QA          Quality Assurance 
RFP        Request for Proposal 
UAT        User Acceptance Test 
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